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SELECTION AND EFFICIENCY IN HIERARCHICAL SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
 








We examine the influence that the degree of stringency in the promotion processes of 
hierarchical systems has on the outcome of such selections at both the local and 
global level. We show that any change in the degree of stringency, whether an 
increase or a decrease, could cause counterintuitive effects. In our analysis, we 
consider a hierarchical system in which there is a large population of agents at each 
level.  Specifically, this level is a continuum of two different kinds of agents, one with 
a greater expected performance (i.e., a higher expected success rate) than the other. 
The agents interact among themselves in groups and in an environment that is 
stochastic and idiosyncratic (for the group). The social institution promotes agents a 
posteriori, on the basis of their performance. We consider diverse systems for such 
promotion processes, with varying degrees of stringency, and study their long-run 
behaviour patterns.  
 
We find that the degree of stringency can be counter-productive for the homogeneity 
of a population in hierarchical systems. In the process for the selection of agents to be 
promoted, an increase in stringency beyond a certain point favours, surprisingly 
enough, agents with lower probabilities of success. Thus, the more stringent the 
system is, the more heterogeneous the population becomes in the long run, both 
kinds of agents survives. On the other hand, when the stringency of the system is 
maintained between two fixed thresholds, the more-successful agents are the only 
ones who survive. Finally, when the stringency of the system is too low, both 
homogeneous equilibria (we only consider two kinds of agents) are stable and the 
dynamics depend on the initial conditions, two basin of attraction appear. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n .
Selection processes exist in all societies. In general terms, agents interact among them-
selves, within organizations and institutions, and as a result of such interaction, certain
individuals are promoted over others, achieving a higher status in the form of greater
political or economic power, increased prestige, more responsibility and a wider intellec-
tual inﬂuence. In such selection processes, the characteristics of the individual agents
obviously play an important role, but institutional factors like the degree stringency or
a hierarchical structure, also exert a great inﬂuence on the selection process.
The aim of our study is to understand the role that certain institutional factors play
in deciding the outcome of social selection processes in the long-run.
To clarify the concept of the degree of stringency, we consider the following scenario:
There is a set of agents who may, but might not, interact among themselves. As such,
we may rank them by outcomes or by any other “agent’s characteristic’ we consider to
be of interest. We then select a fraction α ∈ (0,1) of the highest ranks. The closer α is
to zero, the greater the stringency in the selection process, and the closer it is to one,
the less stringent the selection is. In eﬀect, in the latter case, there is practically no
“selection’ process. We could deﬁne the degree of stringency in the promotion system
as 1 − α, i.e., one minus the fraction of agents promoted.
We examine the inﬂuence that the degree of stringency in the promotion processes of
hierarchical systems has on the outcome of such selections at both the local and global
level. We show that any change in the degree of stringency, whether an increase or a
decrease, could cause counterintuitive eﬀects.
We shall now present a brief review of the most pertinent literature on the topic and
the relationship with our work.
Harrington[e.g., 1998a,1998b] focuses on the ﬂexibility of the agents’ behavior, (rigid-
ity vs ﬂexibility). Agents are organized and interact within an evolving social hierarchy
with diﬀerent levels, like a pyramid. The agents are all randomly picked and paired oﬀ
with other agents of their own levels, against whom they must compete. The successful
agent is then promoted to the next level. In such a bilateral competition, the agents
must respond correctly to an exogenous and stochastic environment, which is idiosyn-
cratic to any pair of agents. There are, in fact, two right responses, {A,B}.H a r r i n g t o n
considers three kinds of rules on behavior, two of which are rigid and a third which is
ﬂexible. A rigid rule always triggers Action A (B), irrespective of the environment. The
ﬂexible rule, on the other hand, always allows the right response to the current environ-
ment, and agents can modify their actions as need be. Furthermore, as the agents all
respond to the same rule while they remain in the system, we can then talk about rigid
and ﬂexible agents. Harrington ﬁnds that rigid agents do better in the long run than
ﬂexible agents do, eventually being the only survivors in his social system. A crucial
assumption in Harrington[eg., 1998a,1998b] to arrive at this outcome is that a change
in a ﬂexible agent’s action is accompanied by a reduction of his capacity to implement
the action.
In Harrington[1999a,1999b], he follows his line of study but now introduces the
concept of “social learning”, i.e., young agents, who observe the elder ones at the top of
the hierarchy and imitate them in a bid to become as successful as they are. Imitation,
however, is not perfection. His results in this case are quite similar to those of his
previous analysis: i.e., in the long run, the followers of the rigid rule are the most
successful. In Harrington’s model there seems to be only local selection. One agent
competes with another of his own level and one of them is always subsequently promoted,
regardless of what might be happening within the rest of their level. As such, half of
2the population of each level is always promoted in each period.
In our model, we link the degree of stringency in the promotion system to the number
or fraction of agents it promotes. The higher the number of people promoted, the less
stringent the system is, and, inversely, the fewer promoted, the more stringent it is.
As the system automatically promotes ﬁrst the agents who have the best outcomes (in
their pairs), the more stringent the system is, the more diﬃcult promotion will be for
the agents with poorer outcomes.
In Harrington’s model, we could consider the degree of stringency to be always equal
to 1
2. Half of the population that competes is promoted. In other words, one agent
out of every two, in each period. However, there is no reason why a greater number of
agents could not compete in groups. Let us say, for instance, that instead of pairs, a
group of n agents compete together.
If just one agent out of every ﬁve is promoted, the system is obviously more stringent
than it would be if ﬁve out of six were. The former is a more stringent model than
Harrington’s and the latter is much less stringent than his is.
One of the main objectives of this study is to discover the role that the degree of
local stringency plays in the evolution of such hierarchies.
In many social systems, however, there is not only a local competition for promo-
tion, but also a broader, more global competition throughout each level. In the academic
world, for example, students ﬁrst compete at their own universities (i.e., the local com-
petition), and once they have ﬁnished their courses, the most successful ones from all of
the diﬀerent universities, (i.e., the best outcomes of the local competitions), then com-
pete for a place in a university department, (i.e., the global competition for that level).
If they are successful enough to get a place, they then compete locally again, within
their new departments, in an eﬀort to obtain a Ph.D. degree. After achieving the Ph.D.,
however, they must then compete globally once more, with other Ph.D. graduates from
all of the other universities, for a limited number of jobs in a given number of organi-
zations. Similar processes exist among people who work in a ﬁrm. They ﬁrst compete
within their own groups or departments (locally) and the best ones are candidates to
be promoted The successful candidates, however, must then compete again at a more
global level, with other successful people from other departments, for promotion to a
higher status.
As such, we can consider the selection process as a two-step development. First,
there is a local competition, which produces a more or less intense local selection. The
intensity of this ﬁrst selection depends on the peculiar institutional parameters that
govern the selection, like the degree of local stringency for example. The second stage is
a broader or more global competition, among the agents who were selected in the ﬁrst
round The ﬁnal selection, therefore, depends (among others things) on both the local
and the global degrees of stringen c yi nt h es e l e c t i o np r o c e s s e s .
Vega-Redondo[2000] employs this kind of global selection, using a hierarchical system
that is quite similar to Harrington’s, although with a diﬀerent approach and purpose. In
each period, two agents of the same level are randomly matched in a bilateral coordina-
tion game, as in Harrington’s model. As they must follow the same strategy while they
remain in the system, we can consider two kinds of agents, those who follow the eﬃcient
(equilibrium) strategy and those who choose the other one. There are four possible
outcomes, as expressed below. A proportion ρ of them is promoted to the next level.
The agents with the best payoﬀs are promoted ﬁrst, but the system continues selecting
agents until all of the vacancies (determined by the parameter ρ)h a v eb e e nﬁlled. After
the local competition, agents are ordered in four classes, according to their payoﬀs. The
agents with the best payoﬀs are those who have followed the eﬃcient strategy and were
3matched against other agents who also followed the eﬃcient strategy. The two next best
payoﬀs are for the agents who chose the ineﬃcient strategy, and the worst payoﬀsa r e
for those who followed the eﬃcient strategy but were matched against others who chose
the ineﬃcient strategy. As such, the agents who followed the eﬃcient strategy are either
at the top of at the bottom of the outcome ranking.
Vega-Redondo shows that if the parameter ρ is lower than a certain threshold, the
unique long-run state induces all of the candidates to play the eﬃcient strategy. On the
other hand, if the promotion is rather lax and ρ is greater than the ﬁxed threshold, the
unique long-run state induces all of the candidates to play the ineﬃcient strategy. An
increase in the stringency degree, therefore, favours long-run eﬃciency, since it increases
the fragility of the ineﬃcient conﬁguration.
We should therefore emphasize the fact that while the payoﬀsi nb o t hH a r r i n g t o n ’ s
and Vega-Redondo’s models are obtained in local competitions, there is no local selection
in Vega-Redondo’s model and the local selection in Harrington’s model is ﬁxed and
always equal to 1
2.
Our principal objective, as we have already explained, is to understand the inﬂuence
that the degree of stringency (local and global) in the promotion processes of hierarchical
systems have on the outcome of such selections. More speciﬁcally, we wish to ﬁnd out
what happens when stringency is increased. Does the behavior of the general population
become more homogeneous or more heterogeneous as a result of an increase? Is an
increase in stringency favorable to agents with greater expected performances? And
ﬁnally, is an increase in local stringency equivalent or comparable to one in global
stringency?
In our search for answers, we consider a hierarchy in a setting which, for the sake of
simplicity, is quite similar to Harrington’s model. In other words, there is no interaction
of strategies and the agents’ payoﬀs are independent of the population’s proﬁle. We then
parameterize the degrees of both the local and the global stringencies separately and
quite easily. Only two kinds of agents are considered, one type being more successful in
expected terms than the other and, therefore, having a relative advantage. The agents
interact randomly in groups of n individuals, with each agent of a given level being
matched with another n − 1 agents of his own level, after which their outcomes, good
or bad, are evaluated.
After obtaining the outcomes for all of the agents, the selection system works in
two separate stages: It ﬁrst selects the k (with k ≤ n) agents with the best outcomes
from each group of n agents, (i.e., the local selection1) . The second step is the global
selection, when the agents who were chosen in the local selection are now compared
according to their previous outcomes and a fraction θ of them with the best outcomes
are chosen. As such, only the agents who have been selected in both the local and the
global selections are promoted to the next level.
In summary then, we have a family of promotion systems with diﬀerent degrees of
stringency. S[k,n,θ] is a selection system that works in a hierarchy in which the agents
are randomly matched in groups of n agents. In its ﬁrst step, the system selects k
individuals from each group of n agents, and in the second step, a proportion θ of the
agents thus selected are ﬁnally promoted. Therefore, k
n will be the local promotion
degree and determines the degree of local stringency, and θ will be the global promotion
degree and determines the degree of global stringency. In the promotion system of
Harrington’s model, for instance, k =1 , n =2 , θ =1 .
The present paper is also related with the literature of tournaments developed since
the seminal work of Lazear and Rosen (1981). In this literature we ﬁnd a similar
1The selected agents are a known proportion
k
n of all of the agents who have been matched.
4organization structure as our hierarchical model, for example in Rosen (1986). The pro-
motion of agents is based on the relative performance of the contestant, as in our model.
However, this literature is mainly focused on incentive problems. The tournament is
considered as an incentive device, where the strategic variables of the agents are eﬀort,
and in some papers this variable is risk. (And this literature tries to answer question
like what must be the optimal prize structure to achieve the optimal level of eﬀort). The
tournament literature has mostly focused on the case with homogeneous agents, where
selection problems in the sense discussed here do not arise. Nevertheless, there are some
works which have focused on selection role of contests, e.g., Rosen (1986, Section V),
which consider both the motivation and the selection function of a contest and Hvide
and Kristiansen(2002).
In Rosen (1981) the agents can inﬂuence in his probability of promotion by choosing
a level of eﬀort. There are several types of agents with diﬀerent level of ability. For the
s a m el e v e lo fe ﬀort, the more ability an agent has, the greater his promotion probability
is. Rosen consider only a degree of stringency in his hierarchical system. Thus, if we
ﬁxt h ee ﬀort level (so eliminate the strategic interaction) we obtain one of the diﬀerent
possible speciﬁcation of our model. Unlike Rosen, we are interested in study the role of
the stringency of promotion in the evolution of the hierarchy.
In Hvide and Kristiansen (2002). The agents can inﬂuence in his probability of
promotion by choosing a level of risk. There are two types of agents, the high and low
type. These authors ﬁrstly consider that the agents compete in pairs, however, he also
consider the eﬀect of an increase in the number of contestants. Thus, they also consider
diﬀerent degrees of stringency in the promotion. They obtain the result that an increase
in the degree of stringency could have ineﬃcient outcome, for them ineﬃciency is a
decrease in the promotion probability of the agents of type high. The reason for this
result is the strategic interaction. An increase in the number of contestants increases
the probability that some contestants can be type high, in that case, all the agents have
incentive to assume more risk, and this fact could decrease the probability of promotion
for type high agents. As Hvide and Kristiansen, we also ﬁnd that an increase in the
degree of stringency could have an ineﬃcient outcome. However, as we do not consider
strategic interaction, there must be other reason for this ineﬃciency, as we will see in
the present paper. Thus, we show that even in the case without strategic interaction
the increase of the stringency could have ineﬃcient outcomes.
Our model also present other diﬀerence with these papers of tournaments, unlike
them we use a dynamic approach.
To conclude this introduction, we will say that the main result of our work is that
the degree of stringency can be counter-productive for the homogeneity of a population
in hierarchical systems. An increase in stringency beyond a certain point causes the
population of agents with the highest expected success rate to decrease in the long run.
The reason for this is that an increase in the subpopulation of agents who follow a
certain rule could have either a positive or a negative eﬀects on the dynamics of this
subpopulation. The ﬁnal sign of this eﬀect depends on the values of the institutional
factors, like the degree of stringency in the selection process, and on the expected success
rates assigned to the agents. In other words, the larger the population of a given type of
agent, the greater their probability of achieving promotion will depend on institutional
parameters, and the less it will depend on their success rates. This is because the larger
the population of a given kind of agent is, (near homogeneity, we suppose), the greater
the probability that his opponents will be of his own type, (a probability close to one),
and will therefore be following the same behavior rule as him. As such, they will be either
all successful or all unsuccessful. In such a case, the probability of promotion depends
5mainly on the degree of stringency in the selection process, (i.e. how many people are
promoted). In contrast, the smaller the population of a given kind of agent is, the more
their probability of promotion will depend on their success rates, and the less it will
depend on institutional parameters. In such a case, if the population is sparse and close
to extinction, an individual from that population will almost certainly be matched (with
a probability close to one) against other agents with a diﬀerent behavior rule. Thus,
if he is successful, he will be the only successful agent in his group and, as such, his
probability of promotion will depend mainly on his success rate. In the conclusions of
this study, we analyze the crucial assumption to be able to arrive at this result.
The remainder of this article is presented as follows: Section 2 describes the model,
and Sections 3, 4 and 5 analyze the problem. In Section 3 , we concentrate on the case
of n =2and k =1 , in Section 4,f o ra n yn and k =1 , and in Section 5, the general case.
In Section 6 we study the optimal population proﬁle in accordance with the diﬀerent
institutional payoﬀs that we consider.
2T h e M o d e l .
Consider a hierarchical system with several diﬀerent levels. At each level there is a
large population of agents, speciﬁcally, a continuum of agents. We normalize the size of
the level population to one. For the agents to carry out activities in the system, they
follow one of two strategies or behavioral rules, either A or B. An agent follows the
same strategy as long as he remains in the system. In each period, agents (from the
same level) are randomly matched into groups to do a certain activity. The numbers
of agents in each group is n. The activity is carried out in a stochastic environment
(which is idiosyncratic for the groups), and the agents, therefore, face an environment
of uncertain future.
We consider just two possible outcomes from the agents’ activities, either right or
wrong 2.
We can categorize all of the diﬀerent possible environments into four types:
• Type 1: Strategy A is the right response to the environment and Strategy B is
wrong.
• Type 2: Strategy B is the right response to the environment and the strategy A
is wrong.
• Type 3: Strategies A and B both are wrong responses to the environment.
• Type 4: Strategies A and B both are right responses to the environment.
The probability of an environment of type i is Pi and
P4
i=1 Pi =1with i =1 ,2,3,4.
As we consider that P4 =0 , we suppose that both strategies cannot be right in any
given environment 3. We label the environment of type i as ei,w i t hi =1 ,2,3.
At each level, therefore, a proportion P1 (P2, P3) of the set of groups has a type-1
(2,3) environment. This is assumed to be i.i.d. across levels, so that the probability
that an agent faces a given environment is independent of the environment he has faced
in the past. Although there is individual uncertainty as to the environment, the absence
of aggregate uncertainty simpliﬁes matters.
2We suppose that the system cannot evaluate how good the right activity is or how bad the activity
wrong is.
3This assumption does not aﬀect the results qualitatively.
6An agent who follows Strategy A (B) has a probability of doing the right action
equal to P1 (P2); we could consider this probability as a measure of the ”expected”
performance of this agent. If P1 >P 2, then the agents who follow Rule A have the
highest expected success rate. When we will say "success rate" of a rule, we will refer to
the "expected success rate" of following this rule. It holds in all sections of the paper.
Once the agents have carried out their activities in a speciﬁc environment, the selec-
tion system begins and some of the agents are promoted to the next level. This selection
is based on the ”a posteriori” performance of the agents, i.e., the outcomes of their local
interactions in their own groups.
The concept is quite similar to the way sports leagues are organized. There are
diﬀerent levels and, at each level, players compete in separate groups and the best
player in each group is promoted to the next level. The ﬁn a lg o a lo fe a c hp l a y e ri st o
get the top of the pyramid.
2.1 Promotion Mechanism
In each period, the population of a given level4 is randomly matched in groups of n
agents, who then implement their behavior rules in an idiosyncratic environment. The
outcome is either success or failure in the activity.
The promotion mechanism then begins. It has two distinct steps:
First step, Local Selection:T h ek agents (k ≥ 1) with the best outcomes are chosen
from each group of n individuals as candidates for promotion, they are the “Eligible
Agents”. If there are more agents with the same outcome than available vacancies, they
are chosen randomly to ﬁll the available places. The Eligible Agents represent k
n of the
population of that particular level.
Second step, Global Selection: a proportion θ of the Eligible Agents is selected.
The system ﬁrst selects the Eligible Agents who were the successful competitors in local
competition, i.e., they gave the right response to the their environments, and if all of
the vacancies are not ﬁlled, it then chooses randomly from the Eligible Agents who
failed in their local competitions, i.e., they did not give the right response to the their
environments. The agents eventually promoted represent θ k
n of the population of that
particular level, (which has been normalized to one), see Figure 1
Both the Local and the Global selections, therefore, are based on the outcomes of
the competing agents. The agents with the best outcomes are always selected ﬁrst.
We call the parameter θ the global degree of promotion and it measures the strin-
gency degree5 in the global selection. If θ =1 , there is not global selection, as in
the Harrington’s model, in which case, all the Eligible Agents are promoted to the next
level.
We call the ratio k
n the local degree of promotion and it measures the degree of
stringency in the local selection. If k
n =1 , then there is not local selection, as in Vega-
Redondo’s model, in which case the entire population of agents in the level concerned
become Eligible Agents.
4Which has been normalized to one.
5We parametrize the stringency degree with the proportion of the population that was promoted.
In fact, it is one minus the proportion of promoted agents. As the system ﬁrst promotes the agents
w i t ht h eb e s to u t c o m e s ,t h em o r es t r i n g e n ti ti s ,t h em o r ed i ﬃcult it becomes for the agents with worst
outcomes to be promoted. In other words, if there are 100 vacancies for promotion, for example, and
only the 5 best candidates are chosen, the selection process is obviously much more stringent than it
would be if it promoted 50 candidates. Since the proportion of promoted agents in the local selection
is
k
n and θ in the global selection,
k
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Figure 1: The promotion mechanism.
8By S[n,k,θ] we denote the promotion system that selects k agents from groups of
n agents, in the local selection, and a proportion θ of Eligible Agents in the global
selection. S[2,1,1] would therefore be the promotion system used in Harrington’s model,
and S[2,2,θ] the one employed in the Vega-Redondo model. He, however, models the
interaction among agents quite diﬀerently from either Harrington or us.
We follow both Harrington[1998a,1999a] and Vega-Redondo[2000] in making the sim-
plifying assumption that, at each t, only agents who have not yet suﬀered a set-back in
their promotion are considered to be ”still in the race”, and the rest are no longer to be
considered for promotion, i.e. it is an up or out system.
2.2 The dynamics
The dynamic system functions as follows: The entire initial population lives at the
lowest social level and is comprised of agents who are endowed with either rule A or B.
They are match up in groups, in an idiosyncratic environment, after which, the selection
system begins and some of them are selected for promotion to the next level. In the
following period, the process is repeated, but only among the agents who were selected
in the ﬁrst round, up or out..
If the hierarchy is to be kept going ”full” a fresh cohort of agents must enter the
lowest level at the end of each period to replace the agents who have moved up a rung It is
assumed that the younger agents, who come into the system, imitate the older successful
agents at the top of the ladder. Note that to consider such hierarchical system is the
same as considering a hierarchical system with a lower limit but without any upper
bound, and we study what happens to a single cohort which evolves up through the
system. In the long run, the two systems behave alike and provide the same selection.
We decided, therefore, to study what happens to a single cohort in a hierarchy with no
upper bound. The speciﬁc objective is to observe the evolution of the characteristics of
a cohort of agents as it migrates upward through the hierarchy.
Let at denote the proportion of the population of level t who follow Strategy A,a n d
bt denotes Strategy B (Note that bt =1−at ). An agent who follows Strategy A (B)i s
referred to as an A-Type (B -Type) agent. As such, we need only study the dynamics
of at, since the population that follows Strategy B will be bt =1− at. Finally, let n be
the number of agents in a group.
In short, the state of the system is given by at ∈ [0,1]. The probabilities of exogenous
environments is given by P1,P 2 ∈ (0,1);P1 + P2 ≤ 1, and the institutional parameters
are θ ∈ (0,1] and k>1.
Deﬁnition 1 a∗ ∈ [0,1] is a globally stable equilibrium of the dynamic system given by
at = f(at−1) if for all a0 ∈ (0,1) lim
t→∞
at = a∗
a∗[X] denotes the globally stable equilibrium under the selection process X.
93 Selection in Pairwise Contest.
In this section, we study the case in which n =2 , i.e., one agent is matched with
another agent. Thus, the local competition is in groups of two agents. This is enough
to understand the role of the parameter θ in the long-run selection. Obviously, in such
a case the parameter k c a no n l yh a v et w ov a l u e s ;e i t h e rk =1or k =2 . In the latter
there is no local selection. Therefore, if n =2 , there are only two degrees of stringency
in the local selection.
In the ﬁr s tp l a c e ,w es t u d yt h ec a s ei nw h i c hk =1 . In other words, we study the
family of the promotion system S[n=2,k=1,θ]. The second part of this section addresses
the case S[n=2,k=2,θ]
3.1 The promotion system S[n =2 ,k=1 ,θ].
We ﬁrst show how we obtain the dynamic equation.
In the ﬁrst period, the agents are matched in pairs, after which, we have three
possible kinds of groups; (AA) both agents following A, (BB) both agents following B
and (AB) each agent following a diﬀerent rule. Since we normalize the population of a
given level to one, the number of groups6 is 1
2, since the size of each group is two (n =2 ).
At level t, and after the random matching, there are 1
2a2
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It must be remembered that the system selects a proportion θ of the eligible agents
(Et). It ﬁrst selects the successful eligible agents (ESt) and if there are not enough of
6The number of groups is equal to the number of individual in the population divided by two
7As the population is inﬁnite, we can identify probabilities with frequencies or proportions.
8Note that the eligible (Et)a g e n t sa r e
1
2 of the population,
1





t eligible agents who were in AA groups, (one agent from each group). Moreover, a
proportion P1 of them were the environment e1 and, therefore, were successful. There are also atbt
agents from the AB groups, and a proportion P1 +P2 were in e1 or e2 and were successful as well. And,
ap r o p o r t i o nP2 of the agents from the BB groups were successful as well.








Before obtaining the dynamic equation, we must consider two diﬀerent possible cases:
First case.I fθ1
2 ≤ ESt, i.e., the number of agents (θ1
2) selected from the eligible
ones is smaller than or equal to the eligible agents that are successful (ES), then, the
system only selects agents who were successful. In Figure 2 we can see all the eligible
agents (1/2 of the total population).














Figure 2: Selection in the ﬁrst case
In such a case, the parameter θ is not important, since the relative proportion of
agents who follow strategy A is the same for any θ. The reason for this is that the system
selects a quantity θ1
2 of agents randomly from among the ESt. Since the proportion of
agents who follow strategy A in ESt is
ESa
t
ESt , this will be the proportion of A-agents in










Second case.W en o wf o c u so nt h ec a s eθ1
2 >E S t, in which the system selects all





agents are selected from EU.S e eF i g u r e3.
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Figure 3: Selection in the second case
In this case, the A-agents selected by the system are all of the ESa
t agents, plus the





.W ea l r e a d yk n o wESa
t
11Note P3=1− P1 − P2 and at =1− bt
11but now we need to know the agents who are doing A within the fraction θ1
2 − ESt
selected. The proportion of agents following strategy A in EUt is
EUa
t
EUt ,t h u s ,t h en u m b e r










































>E S t (2)
As such, the state at level t +1is described by the following equation.
at+1 =
½
f1(at) if at2P1 − a2
t(P1 + P2)+P2 ≥ θ
f2(at) if at2P1 − a2
t(P1 + P2)+P2 <θ
(3)
Where f1(at) is the right-hand side of the equation 1 and f2(at) is the right-hand
side of the equation 2.
Before studying the long-run behavior with the previous equation, we shall ﬁrst
consider a special case:
We assume that the number of agents selected (i.e. 1
2θ agents) by S[2,1,θ] is smaller
than the number of eligible agents that have been successful (ESt). Thus, we consider
a sub-set of selection systems that are the most stringent ones among the family of
selection systems S[2,1,θ]. Note that, since we consider θ a ﬁx parameter, if ESt changes
with t, we might have, at any moment, that θ1
2 >E S t. We could avoid this, however, as




Therefore, if θ ≤ ˆ θ =m i n {P1,P 2},a l w a y sθ1
2 <E S t.
We get the following results for θ ≤ ˆ θ (We name S[2,1,θ≤ˆ θ] the family of selection
system under that assumption).
Proposition 1 Let us assume ˆ θ =m i n {P1,P 2}, and consider the selection process





0 if P2 ≥ 2P1
2P1−P2
P1+P2 if 2P1 >P 2 > 1
2P1
1 if P2 ≤ 1
2P1
This result establishes that, if the degree of stringency is suﬃciently high, i.e., the
parameter θ is smaller than min{P1,P 2}, we can observe two characteristics in the
behavior of the system in the long run: In the ﬁrst place, the population proﬁle does not
depend, in the long run, on the degree of stringency. (The reason for this has already
been explained). Secondly, if the diﬀerence between the expected success rates of the
two diﬀerent rules14 is not high (2P1 >P 2 > 1
2P1), in the long run, there are agents
who continue following either rules. If that gap happens to be wide enough, however,
12Note that the total number of selected agents is θ
1
2. We therefore divide the total number of A-agents















2 is concave in at,t h e
minimum is either in at =0or in at =1 .N o t et h a tat ∈ [0,1].
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Figure 4: The three regions represent the three possible kind of outcomes in the long run.
in the long run, the entire population ﬁnally decides to follow the rule with the higher
expected success rate (Figure 4).
Note that the higher the stringency degree, (i.e., the lower θ is), the more diﬃcult
it should be for the agent with bad outcomes to be promoted. Nevertheless, if the
diﬀerence between the two rules is not too great, we ﬁnd that even under the worst
conditions for agents with bad outcomes, (i.e., with small θ), in the long run, there
are still agents who keep following the rule with the lower expected success rate. Such
agents manage to survive despite their lower expected success rates.
It seems reasonable to expect, therefore, that when the stringency degree is suﬃ-
ciently low, (i.e., a high θ,s i n c ei ta ﬀords the agents with bad outcomes a better chance
of promotion), the agents with the lowest expected success rates also manage to sur-
vive in the long run. As the results we present below clearly show, however, this is
surprisingly not the case. The more stringent the system is, (i.e., the smaller θ is), the
better the agents with the worst success rates survive, provided that their ”expected”
performances or success rate gap (|P1 − P2|)i sn o tt o ow i d e .
The following proposition gives us the globally stable equilibrium of the system
under the selection process S[n=2,k=1,θ]. Without loss of generality, we consider the
environment e1 more common, P1 >P 2, i.e., that the agents who follow Rule A have
a greater success rate, in other words, a greater expected performance. The expression
represented15 by a∗∗ depends on P1, P2 and θ.
15Expression a
∗∗ is the same as the root a3 in the proof of Proposition 2, and it is the only feasible

















Proposition 2 Let P1 >P 2, ¯ θ1 = 3P1P2
P1+P2, ¯ θ2 =
P2
1 +2P2−P1(1+P2)
P2 and16 consider the
selection process S[n=2,k=1,θ] given by the equation(3). The globally stable equilibrium is:









P1+P2 when θ ≤ ¯ θ1
a∗∗ when ¯ θ1 <θ<¯ θ2
1 when ¯ θ2 <θ≤ 1





Corollary 1 If θ ∈ [¯ θ1,¯ θ2] then a∗∗ ∈ [2P1−P2
P1+P2 ,1]. Moreover, a∗∗ is increasing in θ.
The proposition outlined above establishes that for great diﬀerences between the
success rate of the two rules followed by the agents (P2 ≤ 1
2P1) in the long run, all of
the agents will follow the rule with the best success rate17 (A ). Thus, the value of θ
does not really matter, as we get the same result (in the long run) for any θ.I no t h e r
words, the degree of stringency does not matter in the long run. As such, the relative
advantage of one rule is too great to be counteracted by any degree of stringency in the
promotion system.
On the other hand, if that gap between the two success rates P1 and P2 is not too
high (P2 > 1
2P1), in the long run, the population proﬁle depends on the value of the
parameter θ, i.e., the degree of stringency in the system:
• If θ is smaller than a certain threshold (¯ θ1), the agents with the worst success rates
(B) survive in the long run. Moreover, the proportion of agents following any given
strategy does not change in the long run with θ. Notice that for agents who follow
the strategy with the lower success rate, this scenario is the best one. They survive
in greater proportions than in any other speciﬁcation of the parameter θ.
• If θ is located between the two thresholds, (¯ θ1 <θ<¯ θ2), the long-run behavior
depends on the parameter θ.I fθ increases (i.e., if the stringency degree decreases),
the proportion of agents who follow the strategy with the worst success rate de-
creases, and if it is equal to or greater than the second threshold, they completely












(see proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix).
Moreover, obviously ˆ θ<¯ θ1
17When we say "success rate" of a rule, we refer to the "expected success rate" of following this rule.
It holds in all sections.
14Therefore, the proposition and corollaries outlined above establish, surprisingly enough,
that the more stringent the system is (i.e., the smaller θ is), the better the chances the
agents with the worst success rates have of surviving, (provided that the gap between
their ”expected” performances, or success rates, is relatively low). This occurs in spite
of the fact that the probability of agents with bad outcomes being promoted increases
provided that the stringency degree decreases (θ increases). In other words, if more
(fewer) people are promoted, it is easier (more diﬃcult) for agents with bad outcomes
to be promoted, and, obviously, agents who follow the rule with the worst success rate
obtain bad outcomes more often than those who follow the one with the best success
rate. In the long run, however, the greater the stringency is, the higher the number of
agents who follow the rule with the worst success rate.
To give a clearer picture of just what is happening, we shall ﬁrst try to simplify
the matter a bit. We continue considering P1 >P 2, and as such, we associate agents
who follow the A(B) rule (labelled A(B) -agents) with agents with high (low) success
rates. We shall now focus on their chances of promotion. Note that, the population of
A(B)-agents increases if the probability of promotion is greater for A(B)-agents than it
is for B(A) agents. If both probabilities are equal, the population ratios do not change
and the system is therefore in equilibrium.
Provided θ =1 , the only globally stable equilibrium is a =1 , when all of the agents
are following Rule A. If θ decreases, however, this equilibrium becomes unstable and
the system converges to a stable globally mixed equilibrium in which there are agents
following both rules.
We now focus on the system in which at ' 1,i nw h i c hc a s e ,i fθ is relatively small
(θ<ˆ θ = P2), the probability of an A-agent being promoted is 1
2P1.T h i s i s b e c a u s e
an A-agent is matched with another A-agent with a probability close to one. There
is therefore a probability of 1
2 that an A-agent will pass the local selection, (i.e., of
being an eligible agent). Since θ is relatively small, the A-agent must necessarily be a
successful eligible agent for him to be promoted to the next level, which occurs with a
probability of P1. On the other hand, a B-agent also has a probability close to one of
being matched against an A-agent. Thus, there is a probability of P2 that he will pass
the local selection. For B-agents, the only possibility of passing the local selection is by
responding correctly to his environment. Therefore, if P2 > 1
2P,t h e na =1is unstable.
In conclusion, if at ' 1, the local selection is harder for the B-agents than for
the A-agents. As a result almost all of the B-agents who pass the local selection are
successful, which, in fact, is their only possibility of passing. If, therefore, the level of
global stringency increases, (i.e., if θ decreases), the ones who are negatively aﬀected
are the A-agents, and more speciﬁcally, the unsuccessful eligible A-agents.
3.2 The promotion system S[n =2 ,k=2 ,θ].
Since we have considered (in the previous section) the size of the local group to be equal




and, therefore, two degrees of local stringency 1
2 and 0. As the former has already been
studied in the previous section, we shall now study the latter case, for which, we should
emphasize, there is no local selection. The entire population of a level who are matched
for promotion will be eligible agents. We follow the same method as before to obtain
the dynamic equation.
15ESt = at P1 + btP2
ESa
t = at P1
EUt = at (P2 + P3)+bt(P1 + P3)
EUa
t = at (P2 + P3)
Note that all the agents are eligible and as before, so that a proportion (P1)o f
the A-agents (atP1), as well as a proportion (P2)o ft h eB-agents (btP2) will always be
successful. If we consider other promotion systems with greater values of k or n,t h e
previous sentence is quite true, provided that k = n. Therefore, the previous equations
will be the same for any value of k or n, provided that k = n,( i . e . ,t h a ta l lt h ep r o m o t i o n
systems in which k = n w i l lh a v et h es a m ed y n a m i c s ) .
The following equation describes the state at level t +1 :
at+1 =
( atP1
at(P1−P2)+P2 if at(P1 − P2)+P2 ≥ θ
at(P1−P2+(1−P1)θ)+a2
t(P1−P2)
(1−at(P1−P2)−P2)θ if at(P1 − P2)+P2 <θ
(4)
The next proposition shows us that if there are not local selection, i.e.,the local
stringency degree is equal to 0, the agents who follow the rule with the higher success
rate will ﬁnally be the only survivors.
Proposition 3 Let P1 >P 2 and consider the selection process S[2,2,θ] given by the
equation(4).
The globally stable equilibrium is:
a∗[S[2,2,θ]]=1
It would seem, therefore, that a change in the local stringency degree has a similar
eﬀect to a change in the global stringency degree. If the local stringency changes from
1
2 (it was studied in the previous section) to 0, (i.e., if there is no local selection), the
only survivors, in the long run, are the A-agents.
If we really wish to understand the eﬀect of the degree of local stringency, however,
we must study a more general case, with larger local groups, as it allows us to consider
diﬀerent degrees of local stringency.
4 Groups of n agents with k =1 , S[n,k =1 ,θ].
In this section, we study the case of S[n,k =1 ,θ].W ea s s u m ek =1and consider n as
a parameter. As such, we analyze the eﬀect of an increase in the size of local groups
on the long-run population proﬁle. The agents now interact in groups of n agents. In
the previous section we have studied a particular case of this scenario. If we consider
diﬀerent group sizes, we can also consider diﬀerent local stringency degrees. We have
already shown that the degree of local stringency could be measured by the quotient k
n,
in fact, it is equal to 1 − k
n. By changing the parameter n, therefore, we can consider



























16Before obtaining the dynamic equations, we need to know how many groups there
are. Note that we have at agents following Rule A and bt following Rule B at level t,
with at +bt =1 . Since they are the agents who must compete to be promoted, they are
randomly matched in groups of n. Thus, the probability that there is an A-agent in one
of these groups is equal to at. Therefore, the probability of there being a group with a






t (1 − at)n−x
Since there is a population of agents that is equal to one, there are 1
n groups of n






t (1 − at)n−x groups with x agents following Rule A.


















































t (1 − at)n−xx
n
P3
To obtain the number of agents who have passed the local selection and, in addition,
have been successful after the matching up in their groups (i.e., ESt), we must consider
the following facts: First, since one agent from each group passes the local selection
(k =1 ), the number of agents who are ﬁnally selected is equal to the number of groups
there are. Secondly, all of the diﬀerent kinds of groups have A-agents except one, which is
the kind of group in which all the agents are B-agents (in which case, x =0 ). Therefore,
the proportion20 P1 of the groups with A-agents will be equal to the number of agents
who pass the local selection successfully and, moreover, follow Rule A.W ew o r ka l o n g
the same lines to obtain the B-agents who pass the local selection successfully.
Obviously, the number of agents who pass the local selection unsuccessfully21 (EUt)




minus the agents who
pass it successfully (ESt). Finally, the number of A-agents who pass the local selection
unsuccessfully (EUa
t ) will be equal to: (1) the number exclusively A-agent groups (an
t )
under either Environment e2 or Environment e3 (which occurs with a probability of (P2+
P3)), and (2) we must add up the groups with both kinds of agents under Environment
e3,i nw h i c hc a s e ,a l lo ft h ea g e n t sh a v et h es a m eprobability of being promoted, all agents
in those group gave the bad respond to the environment. Therefore, the probability that
the agent selected would be an A-agent is equal to x
n.
Analogously to the previous sections, for n =2 , the proportion of A-agents in Level
t +1must be:
19The x is distributed as a binomial distribution, x v B(n,at).
20A proportion P1 of the groups are under the environment e1,i nw h i c hc a s e ,R u l eA is the right
response to the environment.






















if ESt < θ
n
Therefore, if we replace those expressions presented above, we obtain the dynamic






















To understand what happens in the long run, we consider two extreme cases, one
in which there is no global selection, (i.e., θ =1 ), and another in which there is the
strongest global selection22 (i.e.,θ ≤ ˆ θ =m i n {P1,P 2}).
4.1 The promotion system S[n,k =1 ,θ=1 ]
In such a case, equation (5)w i l lb e :
at+1 =( 1− (1 − at)n)P1 + an
t P2 + at(1 − P1 − P2) (6)
Here we ﬁnd two possible kinds of long-run behavior, either homogeneous, with the
entire population following the same rule, or heterogeneous, with both rules persisting
in the long run. It is not possible, however, to ﬁnd an explicit expression for the het-
erogeneous equilibrium, which we denote by a∗
M1.W h e r ea∗
M1 is a root of the equation:
at+1 − at =( 1− (1 − at)n)P1 + an
t P2 − at(P1 + P2)=0 (7)
This root belongs to the open interval (0,1), and it exists and is unique provided that
1
(n−1)P1 >P 2 > (n − 1)P. (See appendix).
Proposition 4 Consider the selection process S[n,1,θ=1] given by the equation(6).T h e





0 if P2 ≥ (n − 1)P1
a∗
M1 if 1
(n−1)P1 <P 2 < (n − 1)P1
1 if P2 ≤ 1
(n−1)P1
Corollary 2 Let P1 >P 2. In this case a∗[S[n,1,θ=1]] is decreasing in n.T h u s ,a∗[S[n,1,θ=1]] ≥
a∗[S[n+1,1,θ=1]] and the inequality is strict, provided that 1
(n−1)P1 <P 2.
Let us suppose that P1 >P 2. In such a case, the greater the gap between the success
rates (|P1 − P2|) is, the greater the advantage obtained from following Rule A is. As we
can see from the previous proposition, if the gap between the success rates is suﬃciently
high, (P2 ≤ 1
(n−1)P1), the entire population follows Rule A in the long run.
On the other hand, in the local competition, an agent has to compete with n − 1
others and if that number increases, (i.e., if n increases), the increased competition in
22As in the previous section, with n =2 , the minimum value of the expresion ESt =
1
n
((1 − (1 −
at)
n)P1 +( 1− a
n
t )P2) with at ∈ [0,1] is equal to
1
2 min{P1,P2}.
18local selection makes it more diﬃcult for an individual agent to pass it. An increase
of n produces an increase in the local stringency degree of the selection process, i.e., k
n
decreases.
The previous proposition demonstrates that no matter how large the diﬀerence be-
tween the success rates (|P1 − P2|)o ft h et w od i ﬀerent rules is, if n increases enough,
the rule with the lower success rate survives in the long run. (See Figure (5)).
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Figure 5: The three regions represent the three possible qualitative outcomes in the long run.
Note that if n increases, the shaded region, where both kinds of agents survive in the long run,
also increases.
The previous corollary establishes that, if n increases, the proportion of agents who
follow the rule with the lower success rate increases in the long run.
In short, no matter how small the success rate of a rule is, if the local stringency
degree is high enough, this rule survives in the long run. Moreover, the greater the local
stringency degree is, the larger the proportion of agents who follow the rule with the
lower success rate will be. This might well seem paradoxical, but the explanation for it
is outlined in the next section.
To conclude this section, note that if n goes to inﬁnity, equation (6)g o e st ot h e
equation at+1 = P1 + at(1 − P1 − P2), and therefore, a∗[S[n,1,θ=1]] goes to P1
P1+P2.T h u s ,
if P1 >P 2 then a∗[S[n,1,θ=1]] ∈ ( P1
P1+P2,1].I n t h e F i g u r e 6 we can see the dynamic
function(6)w i t hd i ﬀerent values of n.
4.2 The promotion system S[n,k =1 ,θ≤ ˆ θ =m i n {P1,P 2}].




always smaller than the number of agents who pass the local selection (ESt). All of the
agents who were promoted, therefore, were successful in their environments. Thus, we
can rewrite the equation (5) in the following way.
at+1 =
(1 − (1 − at)n)P1
(1 − (1 − at)n)P1 +( 1− an
t )P2
(8)




















Figure 6: The graph represents three diﬀerent dynamic functions at+1 = f(at) for the selection
processes S[n,1,θ=1] with P1 =0 .6 and P2 =0 .3. We consider three functions with three
diﬀerent sizes of groups, n =2 , n =4and n =1 0.
As in the previous section, we ﬁnd two possible kinds of long-run behavior, either
homogeneous, with the entire population following the same rule, or heterogeneous, with
both rules persisting in the long run. It is not possible to ﬁnd an explicit expression for
the heterogeneous equilibrium, which we denote by a∗
M2.W h e r e a∗
M2 is a root of the
equation:
at+1 − at =
(1 − (1 − at)n)P1
(1 − (1 − at)n)P1 +( 1− an
t )P2
− at =0 (9)
This root belongs to the open interval (0,1) and this root only exists and is unique
provided that 1
nP1 >P 2 >n P 1.
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 5 Consider the selection process S[n,1,θ≤ˆ θ=min{P1,P2}] given by the equation





0 if P2 ≥ nP1
a∗
M2 if 1
nP1 <P 2 <n P 1
1 if P2 ≤ 1
nP1






0 and it has the same roots as the equation (1−(1−at)n+1)P1+an+1
t P2−a(P1+P2)=0 ,
and there is only one diﬀerence between this last equation and equation (7), which is
that n +1appears instead of n. We can therefore state that:
a∗[S[n+1,1,θ=1]=a∗[S[n,1,θ≤ˆ θ]]
Moreover, since the equilibrium is decreasing in n (provided P1 >P 2 ):
a∗[S[n,1,θ=1] ≥ a∗[S[n,1,θ≤ˆ θ]]
Thus, we know that if θ changes from 1 to ˆ θ, the global stringency increases. Likewise,
if n changes to n+1, the local stringency degree increases. As we can see, therefore, in
20the long run the eﬀect is the same in both cases. If we increase the size of the groups by
one individual, the eﬀect, in the long run, is the same as imposing the highest degree of
global stringency ( from θ =1to θ ≤ ˆ θ).
On the other hand, note that if n goes to inﬁnity, the equation (8)g o e st ot h e
equation at+1 = P1
P1+P2, and therefore, a∗[S[n,1,θ≤ˆ θ]] goes to P1
P1+P2.T h u s , i f P1 >P 2
then a∗[S[n,1,θ≤ˆ θ]] ∈ ( P1
P1+P2,1]
In conclusion, the two scenarios outlined above are both extreme cases (in θ)o ft h e
family of selection processes S[n,1,θ], i.e., there is no global selection at one extreme
(θ =1 ) and at the other extreme, the global selection is the hardest (θ ≤ ˆ θ). Therefore,
the behavior of the systems with any θ must be somewhere between the two extremes. As
we have seen, therefore, the eﬀect of an increase in the degree of stringency in selection
processes, whether local or global, is an increase in the proportion of agents who follow
the rule with the lower success rate in the long run, provided that the diﬀerence between
the success rates between the two rules is not too high.
So far, however, we have only considered degrees of stringency that are greater than
1
2, i.e., degrees of promotion smaller than 1
2. Note also that the agents who are promoted
to the next level are from a population that has been normalized to 1. Therefore, the
stringency degree23 is 1
nθ, the product between the local and global degrees of stringency.
We now wish to know what happens when the stringency degree is smaller than 1
2 i.e., the
proportion of agents promoted are greater than 1
2.T oﬁnd the answer to this question
we are going to study, (in the following section), the more general family of promotion




5 The general case S[n,k,θ].
We now consider the more general promotion system. The objective is to know what
happens with low levels of stringency. As we have already mentioned, in this case, the
agents are randomly matched in groups of n agents. The best k agents in each group
are selected after the realization of the idiosyncratic environment. These are the eligible
agents, i.e., those who have passed the local selection. Afterwards, a proportion θ of all
the eligible agents are selected for promotion, which is the global selection. Therefore,
a proportion k
nθ of all the agents who compete for promotion are eventually promoted
to the next level.
In this section, we simplify matters by considering that:
P3 =0(i.e. P1 + P2 =1 )a n dP1 >P 2
Therefore, Rule A has a greater success rate than Rule B has, and we can obtain
the following expressions in the same way as we did in the previous section.
23It should be remembered that, for us, the stringency degree of a promotion system is parameterized
by the proportion of agents promoted (one minus this proportion). As the system ﬁrst promotes the
agents who have had the best outcomes, the more stringent the system is, the more diﬃcult promotion




















































































t (1 − at)n−xP2





t (1 − at)n−x of groups with
x agents who follow Rule A (A-agents) and there are 1
n groups in a level. After the
realization of the environment, these groups can now be divided into two diﬀerent types:
groups under the environment e1, ( a proportion P1 of all the groups), and groups under
the environment e2, (a proportion P2 of all the groups).
If we wish to know ESa
t ,i . e . ,t h en u m b e ro fA-agents who have passed the local
selection, and who, furthermore, have been successful in their groups, we must consider
only the groups under environment e1. Obviously, Rule A is the successful rule for these
groups alone. If the group has a number x<kof A-agents, therefore, a number x of A
-agents will be chosen, and if x ≥ k,t h e nan u m b e rk of A-agents are selected from the
groups under environment e1. Thus, such agents are the successful eligible agents who
follow Rule A (ESa
t ) and who have passed the local selection.
W ec a nw o r ki ns i m i l a rw a yt oo b t a i nESt (= ESa
t +ESb
t), and EUa
t . To obtain the























if ESt < k
nθ
(10)
The expression we obtain after the replacement, however, is far too large and complex
and, furthermore, we did not consider it interesting enough to include it in this paper.
Moreover, the complexity of the equation makes it impossible for us to work in the same
way as we did in the previous section.
We use numerical calculus to discover the behavior of the system in the long run. We
ﬁnd that, in the long run, there are three diﬀerent kinds of behavior, which are shown
in Figure 7.
Obviously, a =0and a =1are always equilibria or stationary points of the system.
Moreover, there are some cases in which one other (inner) equilibrium arises24 ,i . e . ,
it belongs to the open interval (0,1). The existence of this inner equilibrium and the
stability of all equilibria depend on the parameters {P1,P 2,n,k,θ}.
As can be seen in the Figure 7, there are three possible types of long-run behavior:
(a) an inner equilibrium exists and it is globally stable, (b) there is no inner equilibrium
24We ﬁnd by numerical calculus that the equation f(at)−at =0has at most o n es o l u t i o ni nt h eo p e n
interval at ∈ (0,1).
















































Type I                             Type II               Type III
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stable equilibrium)
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(two homogeneous locally 
stable equilibria)
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Figure 7: We represent the dynamical function at+1 = f(at) for three diﬀerent parameter
speciﬁcations.
and a =1is globally stable, and (c) an inner equilibrium exists which is unstable. In
this latter case, there are two basins of attraction, and a =0and a =1are locally
stable. We ﬁnd the ﬁrst sort of behavior only when the stringency degree is high. If
it increases, however, we then ﬁnd the second sort of behavior, and the two basins of
attraction appear only when the stringency degree is low enough.
We now wish to discover precisely when the system has any of the three diﬀerent
kinds of behavior. To do so, we analyze the stability of the equilibria a =0and
a =1 . The stability of these equilibria determines the existence and stability of the
inner equilibrium since the system can only have one of the three diﬀerent kinds of
behavior that we have found by numerical calculus.
Note that if the system is in a period t (or level t), the proportion of A-agents
increases or decreases in t+1depending on the probabilities for promotion of the agents
in t. In others words, if the promotion probability of an A-agent is greater than that of
an B-agent in period (or level) t, then the proportion of A-agents increases in the next
period (or level). Obviously, in such a case, the proportion of B-agents decreases.
If we wish to know when Equilibria (a =0and a =1 ) are either stable or unstable,
therefore, we can study the promotion probabilities, outlined above, when the system
are close to these equilibria. For example, if we prove that the probability of promotion
for an A-agent is greater (smaller) than it is for a B-agent, provided that the system
is indeﬁnitely very close to a =0 , then we can state that these equilibria are unstable
(stable). We can do the same thing with a =1 . Thus, we obtain the following result,
which explains when Equilibria a =0and a =1are either (locally) stable or unstable.
(See appendix).
Proposition 6 Let P1 >P 2, P3 =0and consider the selection process S[n,k,θ] given by
the equation(10).
If θ<P 1 and,
k
n < P2
P1 then a =0and a =1are unstable.
k
n ≥ P2
P1 then a =0is unstable and a =1is stable.
If θ ≥ P1 and,
23k
nθ<P 2 then a =0and a =1are unstable.
P2 ≤ θ ≤ P1 then a =0is unstable and a =1is stable.
k
nθ>P 1 then a =0and a =1are stable.
These results show that if the global promotion degree θ is smaller than the success
rate of Rule A , i.e., the e1 probability(P1), then the qualitative behavior does not
depend on θ in the long run. It only depends on the local promotion degree k
n, and, if
it is smaller than P2
P1, then both equilibria are unstable. Thus, the inner equilibrium25
aM exists and is globally stable, a∗[S[n,k,θ]]=aM, long run behavior TypeII.
On the other hand, if θ ≥ P1, in the long run, the qualitative behavior depends
on the absolute promotion degree k
nθ, i.e., both local and global. In this case, if the
absolute promotion degree is smaller than P2 then the long-run behavior is of Type I.
If it is between P1 and P2,i ti so fType II, and if it is greater than P1,t h e r ea r et w o
stable equilibria and we ﬁnd a long-run behavior of Type III.
We can resume that in the Figure268.T h e r ea r et w oc a s e s :ﬁrst 27 P1 > P2
P1. Secondly,





















































































































Figure 8: The vertical axes of these graphs represent the local promotion degree (k
n), the
horizontal axes represent the global promotion degree (θ). The right graph in the case of P1 < P2
P1
and the left graph in the case of P1 > P2
P1 . We have three regions which represents the three
types of behaviours. TYPE I: a =0and a =1are unstable, the inner equilibrium aM exists
and is globally stable. TYPE II: a =0is unstable and a =1is globally stable. TYPE III:
a =0and a =1are locally stable, aM exists and is unstable.
In conclusion,g i v e nP1 and P2, i.e., given the relative advantage of following a
given rule, an increase in the stringency degree (i.e., k
nθ decreases) has a negative eﬀect
on the homogeneity of the population28 in the long run. As can be seen in Figure 8,i ft h e
25Note that, aM can depend on θ in the long run, although, in such a case θ<P 1, the existence of
aM does not depend on θ.
26As we have already seen in Section 3.2, if
k
n =1then a
∗[S[n,k,θ]] = 1, provided that P1 >P 2.
Therefore, the line
k
n =1is in region of Type II.
27We have that P1 >
P2









28If all the agents follow the same rule in the long-run equilibrium, it is homogeneous. If the two rules
happen to be in equilibrium, however, the equilibrium is heterogeneous. The more equal the proportions
of agents who follow the two diﬀerent rules in equilibrium are, the more heterogeneous the equilibrium
will be.
24stringency degree of the promotion system is low enough, the homogeneous equilibria
(a =0and a =1 )a r eb o t hs t a b l e ,Type III. In such a case, there are two basins
of attraction. As the stringency degree increases, the homogeneous equilibria become
unstable, beginning with the weaker homogeneous equilibrium29, Type II.F i n a l l y , i f
the stringency degree of the system is high enough, both homogeneous equilibria are
unstable and there is an inner or heterogeneous equilibrium that is globally stable, Type
I. Moreover, the higher the stringency degree is, the more heterogeneous the inner
equilibrium will be, which means, no matter how low the success rate of a rule is, if the
stringency degree is high enough, the rule survives in the long run.
In summary then, the more stringent the system is, the more heterogeneous the
long-run behavior is. Thus, if the system is stringent enough, the agents who follow the
less-successful rule manage to survive in the long run. If the stringency of the system
is maintained between two given thresholds, the agents who follow the more successful
rule are the only survivors. Finally, if the stringency of the system is low enough, both
homogeneous equilibria are stable and the dynamics depend on the initial conditions.
To understand why this happens, we must ﬁrst observe that the dynamics of the
system depends on the agents’ probabilities of promotion. The proportion of the kind
of agents who have the greatest probability of promotion in a period (or level) t will
increase in t +1 . Let us now consider a certain type of agent who faces one of the two
following extreme scenarios:
• If a particular type of agent is scarce, (let us say close to extinction), the fact that
the degree of stringency in the system increases does not aﬀect the probability of
promotion of this type of agent. Note that, in general, there would only be one
agent of this type in a group, and such an agent would only be promoted if he
was successful (and, therefore, the rest of agents in his group would have to be
unsuccessful). Thus, if this scarce agents is successful (gives the right respond to
the environment), he will promote almost for sure.
• However, when a given type of agent is quite abundant, (i.e., close to homogeneity),
the fact that the degree of stringency in the system increases does aﬀe c tal o tt h e
probability of promotion of such type of agents. Note that, in general, there would
only agents of this type in the diﬀerent groups. Thus, if all (or close to all) members
of a group are of the same type and, therefore, they give the same response under
t h es a m ee n v i r o n m e n t ,t h e ni td o e sn o tm a t t e ra ta l li fo n ei ss u c c e s s f u lo rn o t .T h e
reason for this is that all of his competitors in his own group are also successful
(or unsuccessful) as he is. The individual’s probability of promotion, therefore,
depends mainly on how many people are promoted.
An increase in stringency, therefore, tends to punish the more common type of agent,
while it does not aﬀect the relatively scarce type. Thus, beyond a certain point, it can
cause the homogenous equilibrium (made up of the more successful agents) to lose its
stability.
On the other hand, if the degree of stringency is low enough, even the homogeneous
equilibrium of the less-successful agents can be stable. This explains why both homo-
geneous equilibria are locally stable in this particular case. Consequently, the dynamics
depend on the initial conditions, and as such, the considerations pertaining to relative
numbers are so important that the long-run behavior depends on the initial conditions.
29If P1 >P 2,t h e na =0is the weaker homogeneous equilibrium, the B-agents are less successful on
average than the A-agents.
25The degree of stringency permits a control over the diversity of a system, and can
either prevent or stimulate the homogeneity of this system.
The less stringent a system is, the easier it is for it to be dominated by one type of
agent and for it to achieve homogeneity.
The more stringent a system is, the more important an agent’s success or failure
in the promotion becomes, and as such, the less important the eﬀect of the relative
proportions of the diﬀerent types of agents is. As we have already seen, if the stringency
degree is low enough, the long-run behavior depends exclusively on the initial conditions.
The fundamental assumption is that the successes (or failures) of agents who
follow the same rule correlate perfectly among themselves. If two agents are under the
same environment and are following the same rule and one of them is successful, then
the other one will be successful as well, with a probability of one.
6T h e O p t i m u m .
In the previous sections we have studied the long-run behavior of a hierarchical social
system with diﬀerent promotion mechanism. We now wish to know something about the
eﬃciency of the selection process to be able to decide on the optimal sort of composition
for a population. To do so, we must ﬁrst establish some institutional payoﬀs30.
We can assign a task to each group, in which the interactions between the agents’
strategies and the stochastic environment yield some sort of payoﬀ for the social in-
stitution. We consider the institutional payoﬀ to be the sum of the payoﬀso fa l lt h e
groups31
Each group in each level interacts with the environment and receives a payment for
their organization. If a group does not give the right response to the environment32,t h e
group receives a payoﬀ of −η with η>0. W ea n a l y z et h ec a s eo fn =2 , i.e., groups
with two agents. As such, we have three kinds of groups33:








group‘sp a y o ﬀs σ 1 σ
failure cost −η −η −η
With η>0,σ > −η
We label the AB group the Mixed Group and the AA and BB groups the Homo-
geneous Groups. If the group matches the environment34, we assume that the payoﬀs
30But before proceeding to do so, however, we must consider the agents who are not promoted and
will no longer be considered for promotion. We could say that they still exist within the system but
are no longer "in the race". In equilibrium, the agents who compete for promotion are included in the
same proﬁle at each level. After the selection system has been put into operation, some of the agents
are promoted while others are not. If the system is in equilibrium, however, the promoted agent’s proﬁle
is still identical to that of the agent who has not been promoted. In equilibrium, therefore, in the long
run, the entire hierarchy has the same proﬁle, i.e., not only the agents who are ”in the race”, but also
the agents who lose that ”race” at any level. This is why, if the promoted agent’s proﬁle is eﬃcient, the
proﬁle of the agents who are not promoted are so also, provided that the system is in equilibrium.
31We consider the group payoﬀ as the social institution payoﬀ. One possible interpretation of the
group’s payoﬀ is to consider it as the aggregation of their individual performances or payoﬀs.
32None of the agents in that group give the right response to their environment.
33AA(BB) groups, composed of two agents who follow the same Strategy A(B),a n dAB groups,
formed by one agent who follows Strategy A and another following Strategy B.
34At least one of the agents gives the right answer to the environment in that group.
26of the two homogeneous groups are identical, whereas the mixed group’s payoﬀ may be
diﬀerent from that of the homogeneous groups. We normalize the mixed group’s payoﬀ
to one and the homogeneous groups’ payoﬀ by the parameter σ (with σ>−η ).
If σ>1 then the homogeneous groups’ payoﬀ is greater than that of the mixed
group when both types of groups match the environment. In such a case, if the group
that matches the environment is the homogeneous one, (with both agents following the
same strategy), there are positive externalities between the two agents. We can imagine
the sort of group assignments that are better carried out if the people who must work
together have received similar training or follow similar strategies.
If σ<1 there are negative externalities between agents following the same
strategy when they match the environment. In this case, we can imagine situations in
which the task can better done if there is less competition within the group.
If σ =1The heterogeneity in the group does not aﬀect the payoﬀ if the envi-
ronment is matched.
Therefore, if σ>1, heterogeneity in the group has a premium, and if σ<1,
then homogeneity in the group has a premium provided that the group matches the
environment.
The institutional payoﬀ for the population of level t (we have at agents following








t(σP2−(1−P2)η)+atbt((P1 +P2)−(1−P1 −P2)η) (11)
The previous expression is quite easy to obtain. For example, the ﬁrst term is the
payoﬀ of the AA groups is obtained as follows: The number of AA groups is 1
2a2
t,a
proportion P1 (the probability environment e1) of them matches the environment and
they obtain a payoﬀ of σ each. The remainder do not match the environment, so they
get a payoﬀ of −η. The rest of the terms are obtained analogously.
Since all of the levels have the same environment probabilities, the optimum popula-
tion proﬁle for one level is also optimum for the other levels as well. We therefore study
the optimum population proﬁle for one level 35.S i n c ebt =1−at,w eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g








(P1 + P2)(2 + η − σ) (12)
The following result shows us the optimal population proﬁle.
Proposition 7 Let us suppose n =2 and the institutional payoﬀ function(12).T h e
optimal proportion of agents following strategy A is36:





P1(1 + η)+P2(1 − σ)
(P1 + P2)(2 + η − σ)
for σ<1+P2
P1(1 + η)
1 for σ ≥ 1+P2
P1(1 + η)
35Note that the population proﬁle that maximizes the institutional payoﬀ function of a level also
maximizes the institutional payoﬀ function of the K levels (K>1).
36Supposing P1 >P 2,n o t et h a t(2 + η − σ)=0and σ<1+
P2
P1(1 + η) are incompatible, because
σ =2+η>1+
P2
P1(1 + η). Therefore, if σ =2+η then ¯ a =1 .





P1(1 + η)+P2(1 − σ)
(P1 + P2)(2 + η − σ)
for σ<1+P1
P2(1 + η)
0 for σ ≥ 1+P1
P2(1 + η)
Note that if the groups that match the environment have the same payoﬀ irrespective
of their composition (σ =1 )then ¯ a = P1
P1+P2 for any η, the optimal population proﬁle
does not depend on the cost of failure. If σ =1then the population proﬁle that
maximizes the institutional payoﬀ i st h es a m ea st h eo n et h a tm a x i m i z e st h en u m b e ro f
groups that match the environment (that occur with at = P1
P1+P2).
Without loss of generality, now we consider the environment e1 to be more common,
P1 >P 2. As such, the agents who follow A (A-agents) are following the strategy with
the higher success rate. The previous proposition shows that there is a threshold of the
homogeneous group’s payoﬀ ¯ σ =1+P2
P1(1 + η) > 1.I f σ<¯ σ, it is optimal to have
agents following both strategies, and if σ>¯ σ, it is optimal that the entire population
only follows the strategy with the higher success rate.
From these results, we obtain the following consequences. Note that σ ∈ (−η,+∞).
Corollary 3 Let P1 >P 2 and η constant:
If σ increases then ¯ a increases, provided that σ<¯ σ =1+P2
P1(1 + η).
If σ decreases then ¯ a decreases, with a minimum value ¯ a = 1
2.
An increase in the homogeneous group’s payoﬀ (in relation to the mixed group’s
payoﬀ)m a k e st h en u m b e ro fA-agents (more successful agents) increase in the optimum
proﬁle37 ¯ a.I f σ decreases the weight of the A-agents in the optimal proﬁle decreases.
However, there is a lower limit beyond which that the optimal proﬁle can never fall 38.
That is ¯ a = 1
2.
Corollary 4 Let P1 >P 2.
Provided σ<1,,i fη increases(decreases), then ¯ a increases(decreases).
Provided σ>1,i fη increases(decreases), then ¯ a decreases(increases).
Provided σ =1 ,i fη changes, then ¯ a does not change.
If the homogeneous group’s payoﬀ is greater than the mixed group’s payoﬀ (σ<1)
then an increase(decrease) in the failure cost39 increases (decreases) the weight of the
more successful agents in the optimum (with a minimum value40 to ¯ a ,t h a ti s1
2).
Before understanding that result note that, if σ<1 then the optimum proﬁle ¯ a






,s e eF i g u r e9.
Note that, if the proportion of agents who follow Strategy A is at = P1
P1+P2 there is
a maximum number of groups matching the environment. However, if σ<1,am i x e d






38If P1 >P2,t h e nw eh a v e
∂¯ a











40Note that η ∈ [0,∞) and if σ<1 then
∂¯ a(η)
∂η > 0, therefore lim





(P1+P2)(2−σ). The previous expresion is increasing in σ. The minimum value that expresion can takes
















28group (AA or BB) does so. Therefore, it is possible to increase the total payoﬀ by
increasing the number of mixed groups that match the environment. This occurs if at
decreases, and the total number of groups that match the environment will obviously
decrease. In such a case, if the failure cost η increases, then the cost of having too many
groups that do not match the environment increases. An increase in η therefore, causes
the optimum proﬁle ¯ a converges to P1
P1+P2 in order to decrease the number of groups




























































and if σ =1then
the optimum proﬁle ¯ aσ=1 is equal to P1
P1+P2.M o r e o v e r , i f σ increases, the optimum proﬁle ¯ a
increases and if the cost of failure increases then the optimum proﬁle converge to P1
P1+P2.
If homogeneous and mixed groups’ payoﬀsa r ee q u a l( σ =1 ) then the failure cost η
does not change the optimum proﬁle ¯ a. The system maximizes payoﬀs by maximizing
the number of groups that match the environment, which occurs in at = P1
P1+P2.
If the mixed group’s payoﬀ is smaller than the homogeneous group’s payoﬀ (σ>1)
an increase(decrease) in the failure cost decreases(increases) the weight of the more
successful agents in the optimum, with a lower bound42 for ¯ a,w h i c hi s P1
P1+P2.N o t e





.I nt h i s
case, a mixed group (AB) that matches the environment obtains a smaller payoﬀ than a
homogeneous group (AA or BB)t h a ta l s om a t c h e st h ee n v i r o n m e n t .W ek n o wt h a ti n
at = P1
P1+P2 the number of groups matching the environment is maximized. However, if
at increases then the number of AA groups matching the environment increases and the
BB and AB groups matching the environment decrease, but the eventual eﬀect is an
increase in the total payoﬀ.T h ee ﬀect of an increase in the failure cost is similar to the
case σ<1,t h u s ,i fη increases the optimum proﬁle approaches to ¯ a = P1
P1+P2, therefore
¯ a decreases, see 9.
Corollary 5 Let P1 >P 2. If the ”expected” performance gap between the two diﬀerent
kinds of agents increases, i.e., ((P1 − P2) increases), then the presence of the more
successful agent in the optimum proﬁle increases, provided that σ<1+P2
P1(1 + η).
In conclusion,g i v e nP1 and P2, ( i.e., given the relative advantage of following
a given rule), we can obtain any proﬁle between (1
2,1), as the optimal proﬁle, for the
possible values of the parameters σ and η. On the other hand, if we consider the selection
42Note that η ∈ [0,+∞) and if σ>1 then
∂¯ a(η)
∂η < 0, therefore lim






43If σ>1 then either ¯ a =
P1(1+η)+P2(1−σ)
(P1+P2)(2+η−σ) or ¯ a =1 , and we have that
∂¯ a(η)







29process S[n=2,k,θ], then changing θ and k (so the stringency degree) we can obtain any
global stable equilibrium between the thresholds (2P1−P2
P1+P2 ,1).N o t et h a ti fP1 >P 2 then
1
2 < 2P1−P2
P1+P2 . Thus, not all possible optimum proﬁles are achieved in this case.
In general, if the optimum is that all, or nearly all, of the population follows the
rule with the higher success rate, then the stringency degree of the system must not be
too high. However, if the optimum is a heterogeneous proﬁle then the stringency degree
must be high.
Obviously, if you consider groups with more than two members, the optimum proﬁle
must be in the interval (1
2,1) (if P1 >P 2). However, as we have shown in section 4 if
the stringency degree goes to 1, i.e., the proportion of people promoted is close to 0,
then the proﬁle in the long run goes to P1
P1+P2. Thus, the interval of possible population





. Therefore, as 1
2 < P1
P1+P2, not all possible optimum
proﬁles would be achieved in this case.
Regarding the interesting work Harrington (1998a) which was the main inspiration
of the present paper, we could say that his results would change in the case that the
degree of stringency increases or decreases. If the level of stringency is increased enough,
the stable equilibrium where the entire population following the more successful rigid
rule would lose his stability and there will be a heterogeneous population in the long
run. Although, we think that the predominance of the rigid rule will hold. And if
the degree of stringency is decreasing enough, all of the homogenous equilibria become
locally stable equilibria.
On the other hand, we must be careful about the stringency degree of promotion
mechanism in hierarchical social systems. As we have shown if we wish to increase the
presence in the social system of certain agents with a greater expected success rate,
perhaps, in certain contexts, we must decrease the stringency of the promotion instead
of increase it.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
That proposition is a particular case of the proposition 2.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We assume P1 >P 2

















t(P1+P2) ) if 2P1at−(P1+P2)a2
t+P2−θ<0
We can write the previous equation as:
at+1 = f(at)=
½
f1(at) if h(at) ≥ 0
f2(at) if h(at) < 0
We prove the proposition in several steps.
We name g(at)=f(at) − at =
½
g1(at)=f1(at) − at if h(at) ≥ 0
g2(at)=f2(at) − at if h(at) < 0
Lemma 1 The function g(at)=f(at) − at is continuous in [0,1].
30It is straightforward to show that f1(at) and f2(at) are continuous, both functions
are a quotient of polynomials and both denominators are strictly greater than zero.
Furthermore, if 2P1at − (P1 + P2)a2
t + P2 = θ then f1(at)=f2(at). Since f(at) is
continuous, g(at)=f(at) − at is continuous as well.¥
Lemma 2 The equation g(at)=0has no more than one root in (0,1).
It is straightforward to show that the equation g1(at)=0has the following roots.
¯ a1 =0 ¯ a2 =1 ¯ a3 = 2P1−P2
P1+P2




















It is straightforward to show that the denominator
¡





The equation g2(at)=0has four roots, two of them are a1 =0and a2 =1 ,t h e








The previous polynomial determine the roots a3, a4 and also the sign of the function
g2(at).I f pol[at] < 0 then g2(at) > 0 ( t h u s ,t h ep o p u l a t i o ni n c r e a s ea tt h a tp o i n t ,
provided that h(at) < 0).
Let pol[at]=αa2













2)+( P1 − P2)
2 +( P1 + P2)(1− θ)
´
> 0
γ = P2 − P2
2 + P1 (P2 + θ − 2) < 0
(13)
Provided that β2 − 4αγ > 0 we will have two diﬀerent real roots from the pol[at].















2α < 1 ⇔− β −
p
β2 − 4αγ > 2α ⇔
⇔−
p
β2 − 4αγ > 2α + β
Note that, if a4 < 1 then it is necessary that 2α+β<0.N e x tw es h o wt h a ti ti sn o
possible to hold simultaneously both conditions; β2 −4αγ > 0 (real a4)a n d2α+β<0.
Using (13) it is straightforward to show that:
2α + β<0 ⇔ (P1 + P2)(1− θ) − 2P2 (P1 − P2) < 0




(P1 + P2)+P1P2 − (P1 + P2)
2
´




2α + β<0 ⇔ (P1 + P2)(1− θ) < 2P2 (P1 − P2)(since the two terms are positive)
⇔ (P1 + P2)
2 (1 − θ)
2 < (2P2 (P1 − P2))
2 .
β2 − 4αγ > 0 ⇔ (P1 + P2)
2 (−1+θ)
2 > 4(P1 − P2)
2
³
(P1 + P2)+P1P2 − (P1 + P2)
2
´




(P1 + P2)+P1P2 − (P1 + P2)
2
´
< (2P2 (P1 − P2))
2 ⇔
P2




It is straightforward to show that the previous expression is always smaller than
zero, for that it is no possible simultaneously conditions; β2 −4αγ > 0 and 2α+β<0,
thus a4 can not be smaller than one. Therefore we can say that a4 ≥ 1.
We know that, if the equation g1(at)=0has one root in (0,1),t h e ni th a st ob e¯ a3
and if g2(at)=0has one root in (0,1) then that has to be a3.T h e r e f o r et h ee q u a t i o n
g(at)=0can have zero, one or two roots in (0,1). We have only two candidates to be
roots in (0,1) of the equation g(at)=0they are ¯ a3 and a3.
N o ww ep r o v et h a tt h ee q u a t i o ng(at)=0can not have two roots in (0,1).
The explicit expressions to ¯ a3 and a3 are:




















g1(at) if h(at) ≥ 0
g2(at) if h(at) < 0
.
First, we will show that h(¯ a3) ≥ 0 ⇔ θ ≤ 3P1P2
P1+P2.









+P2−θ ≥ 0 ⇔
⇔ 3P1P2
P1+P2 − θ ≥ 0.
A f t e rt h a t ,w ew i l ls h o wt h a th(a3) < 0 ⇒ θ> 3P1P2
P1+P2.











2 +P1(P2+θ−2)) < 0
⇒∗
(Note that 2P2
1 +P1 (θ − 1 − 4P2)+P2 (θ − 1+2 P2) smaller than zero is a necessary















32Remark 1 We can state that the equation g(at)=0has no more than one root in
(0,1).I f θ ≤ 3P1P2
P1+P2 then ¯ a3 is the only possibility. If θ> 3P1P2
P1+P2 then a3 is the only
possibility.
Lemma 3 g0(0) > 0
It is straightforward to show that g0
1(0) = 2P1
P2 − 1,s i n c eP1 >P 2 we can state that
g0
1(0) > 0.




(−1+P2)θ , the denominator is negative (−1+
P2)θ<0, and it is easy to show that the numerator is negative as well, P2 − P2
2 +
P1(−2+P2 + θ)=P2(1 − P2)+P1(P2 +( θ − 2)) < 0,t h e r e f o r eg0(0) > 0.¥
Lemma 4 a) If θ ≤ P1 ⇒
h
g0(1) T 0 ⇐⇒ 2P2 T P1
i
b) If θ>P 1 ⇒
h







1(1) provided that h(1) ≥ 0 and h(1) ≥ 0 ⇔ P1 − θ ≥ 0
g0(1) = g0
2(1) provided that h(1) < 0 and h(1) < 0 ⇔ P1 − θ<0
The part a) is easy to prove:
If θ ≤ P1 then g0(1) = g0
1(1) = 2P2
P1 − 1, that expression is greater, equal or smaller
than zero if 2P2 T P1.
The part b):




(−1+P1)θ , the denominator is negative
(−1+P1)θ<0, the numerator is negative positive or zero −P2
1 +P1(1+P2)+P2(−2+θ) S
0 provide θ S
P2
1 +2P2−P1(1+P2)




The next lemma arranges the thresholds of the parameter θ.
Lemma 5 If 2P2 > (≤)P1 ⇒
h






First, it is straightforward to show that:
P1 < (≥) 3P1P2






P2 ⇔ (P1 − 2P2)(P2 + P1(1 − P1 − 2P2)) < (≥)0
Since (P2 + P1(1 − P1 − 2P2) > 0 the sign depend on (P1 − 2P2).¥
































































2 +P1(P2+θ−2)) must be greater
or equal than zero, if it is not, then a3 is not real, see 14. Moreover, if that expression
is equal to zero then a3 = a4 > 1 (i nt h a tc a s ea3 = a4 =
−β
2α > 1).












It is straightforward to show that the expression P12+P1(−1+P2)+(−1+P2)P2




On the other hand, if we do θ =
P2
1 +2P2−P1(1+P2)
P2 in the expression (14) then it is
straightforward to show that a3 =1 .¥
We have the following results:
The function g(at) is continuous in [0,1] and g0(0) > 0, the equation g(at)=0has
no more than one root in (0,1). Therefore we have the following three possibilities:




I ns u c hac a s e ,t h es y s t e mc o n v e r g e st ot h eo n l yr o o ti n(0,1),a tw h i c hp o i n tt h e
system has a global equilibrium. This is true provided that there are not periodic points,
we prove that statement at the end of this prove.
2) If g0(1) < 0 then we could have only two cases:
at=0 a t=1
at
g(at) at=0 a t=1 g(at)
at
Case 1 Case 2
In Case 1, the system converge to at =1 , this point is a global equilibrium of the
system. Case 2 is not possible, we shall now prove this statement.
We know that either ¯ a3 or a3 is the only possible root in (0,1). We shall now prove
that if g0(1) ≤ 0 then the equation g(a)=0does not have any roots in (0,1). Note that
by Lemma 4:
34• If θ ≤ P1 and g0(1) ≤ 0 then by Lemma 4 necessarily 2P2 ≤ P1 and it is straight-
forward to show that if 2P2 ≤ P1 then ¯ a3 ≥ 1,and it can not be the root. We shall
now show that if 2P2 ≤ P1 then a3 can not be root of g(a)=0 . The following
Figure 10 represents the previous lemmas if 2P2 <P 1.
θ
0







PP + 1 P 1
3 1 a < 3 1 a >
3         a is the only possible root 3         a is the only possible root
θ
0







PP + 1 P 1
3 1 a < 3 1 a >
3         a is the only possible root 3         a is the only possible root
Figure 10: The line represents the parameter θ a n dw ei n d i c a t et h ed i ﬀerent thresholds of θ on
it. Below the line, we show what happens when the parameter θ is inside those intervals.
Therefore, if 2P2 <P 1, then the equation g(a)=0can not have any root in (0,1),
and Case 2 is not possible, even if θ>P 1.




P1+P2 = P1 and we have that
¯ a3 =1and a3 can not be the root of the equation g(a)=0 .
• We now consider the case of θ>P 1 and 2P2 >P 1. By Lemma 4 we know that if
θ>P 1 and g0(1) < 0 then necessarily θ>
P2
1 +2P2−P1(1+P2)
P2 and it is straightforward
to show that if θ>
P2
1 +2P2−P1(1+P2)
P2 then a3 > 1 (i fθ =
P2
1 +2P2−P1(1+P2)
P2 then a3 =




and 2P2 >P 1 then ¯ a3 can not be root of g(a)=0 .
θ
0









3         a is the only possible root 3         a is the only possible root
θ
0









3         a is the only possible root 3         a is the only possible root 3         a is the only possible root 3         a is the only possible root
Figure 11: The line represents the parameter θ a n dw ei n d i c a t et h ed i ﬀerent thresholds of θ on
it. Below the line, we show what happens when the parameter θ is inside those intervals.
Therefore, if g0(1) < 0 then the equation g(a)=0does not have roots in (0,1).






Case 1 Case 2
In Case 1, the system converges to at =1 , which is the point of the global equilibrium
of the system. Case 2 is not possible that statement is already proved previously.
In brief:
35• If g0(1) > 0 then the equation g(at)=0has one root in (0,1), that point is a stable
globally equilibrium of the system. We name that point a∗[S[n=2,k=1,θ]] The only




• If g0(1) ≤ 0 then the equation g(at)=0h a sn o n er oo ti n(0,1), therefore a∗[S[n=2,k=1,θ]]=
1.




P2 ). Therefore, a∗[S[n=2,k=1,θ]]=¯ a3 provided that θ ∈ (0, 3P1P2
P1+P2),




P2 ) and a∗[S[n=2,k=1,θ]]=




We know that if 2P2 ≤ P1 then g0(1) ≤ 0. I ns u c hac a s e ,a∗[S[n=2,k=1,θ]]=1and
the value of θ is not important at all.
We shall now prove that there are not periodic points44 of at+1 = f(at).
The function f(at)=
½
f1(at) if h(at) ≥ 0
f2(at) if h(at) < 0
either has just one equilibrium point
in (0,1) or none at all. If it has none, there are obviously no periodical points, and in
the case of the function having just one equilibrium point in (0,1), if the function is
increasing from values that are higher than the inner equilibrium point, any possibility
of there being periodical points completely would disappears. We shall now prove that
the function f(at) is increasing from values that are higher than the inner equilibrium
point.
























Let w(at)=P2 +2 P1at − (P1 + P2)a2
t, that is a concave function with a maximum
in at = P1
P1+P2.N o t e t h a t h(at)=w(at) − θ, therefore f(at)=f2(at) provided that


















44The point b is called a periodic point of xt+1 = f(xt) if for some positive integer k, f
k(b)=b ,S e e
Elaydi [1996].
36It should be noted that all of the terms in the previous expression are always positive,
except for (θ − 1), which is always negative and w0(at), which may be either positive
or negative. The function w(at) is concave, with a maximum in at = P1
P1+P2. Therefore
w0(at) < 0 provided that at > P1
P1+P2¥
Note that a3 is increasing in θ and, if θ = 3P1P2
P1+P2,t h e na3 =¯ a3, we know that if
θ ≤ 3P1P2
P1+P2 then a3 can not be an equilibrium point. Therefore, the minimum value of
an equilibrium point belong to (0,1) is 2P1−P2
P1+P2 .
To complete the proof, we need only show that P1
P1+P2 < 2P1−P2
P1+P2 , therefore we can
state that the function f (at) does not have periodic points.¥
Corollaries 1 and 2 have been proved in the previous proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
We assume P1 >P 2
The dynamics of the selection process S[n=2,k=2,θ] is given by the equation:
at+1 =
( atP1
at(P1−P2)+P2 if at(P1 − P2)+P2 ≥ θ
at(P1−P2+(1−P1)θ)+a2
t(P1−P2)
(1−at(P1−P2)−P2)θ if at(P1 − P2)+P2 <θ
We can write the previous equation as:
at+1 = f(at)=
½
f1(at) if h(at) ≥ 0
f2(at) if h(at) < 0
We name g(at)=f(at) − at =
½
g1(at)=f1(at) − at if h(at) ≥ 0
g2(at)=f2(at) − at if h(at) < 0
We shall now calculate the stationary points:





at (P1 − P2)(1− at)
at(P1 − P2)+P2
Moreover, g1(at) > 0 provided that at ∈ (0,1)




(1−at(P1−P2)−P2)θ − at =
at (P1 − P2)(1− at)(1− θ)
(1 − at(P1 − P2) − P2)θ
Moreover, it is straightforward to show that g1(at) > 0 provided that at ∈ (0,1).
Therefore, a1 =0and a2 =1are the only stationary points and g(at) > 0 for all






PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Without loss of generality we consider P1 >P 2.
The dynamics of the selection process S[n,k=1,θ=1] is given by the equation:
at+1 =( 1− (1 − at)n)P1 + an
t P2 + at(1 − P1 − P2)
Let at+1 = f(at) and g(at)=f(at) − at
We study the function g(at).
The stationary points are the solution of this equation g(at)=0 .
37(1 − (1 − at)n)P1 + an
t P2 − at(P1 + P2)=0
The previous equation does not have an explicit solution. We study the ﬁrst and the
second derivatives.
g0(at)=n(1 − at)n−1P1 + na n−1
t P2 − (P1 + P2)
g00(at)=−n(n − 1)(1 − at)n−2P1 + n(n − 1)an−2
t P2
We now calculate the inﬂection points g00(at)=0in at ∈ (0,1).
−n(n − 1)(1 − ˆ a)n−2P1 + n(n − 1)ˆ aP2 =0
(1 − ˆ a)n−2P1 =ˆ aP2
As (1 − ˆ a),ˆ a,P1,P 2 > 0 we can write:



























Therefore, if n>3 we can then state that the function g(at) has no more than one







Obviously, a =0and a =1are roots of the equation g(at)=0 . We calculate the
second derivative in these points.
g00(0) = −n(n − 1)P1 < 0 g00(1) = n(n − 1)P2 > 0
Therefore, the function g(at) is concave in at =0a n dc o n v e xi nat =1 .A s g(at)
is continuous in at ∈ [0,1], the function g(at) is concave in at ∈ [0,ˆ a) and convex in
at ∈ (ˆ a,1].
We study the ﬁrst derivative of g(at) in a =0and a =1 :
g0(0) = (n − 1)P1 − P2 > 0
Thus, the function g(at) in a =0is increasing.
g0(1) = (n − 1)P2 − P1
Thus, the function g(at) in a =1is:
increasing if (n − 1)P2 >P 1
decreasing if (n − 1)P2 <P 1
Therefore, if (n−1)P2 >P 1, the function g(at) is necessarily equal to zero at just one
point in the open interval (0,1). Calling that point a∗
M1, we can state that the function
g(at) is greater than zero in at ∈ (0,a ∗






M1 if (n − 1)P2 >P 1.
On the other hand, if (n − 1)P2 ≤ P1 then the function g(at) can not have a




=1if (n − 1)P2 ≤ P1.
To complete the proof we need only note that periodical points are not possible.
This is because the ﬁrst derivative of the function f(at) is positive and, as such, f(at)
is increasing. Periodical points are therefore not possible.
38f(at)=( 1− (1 − at)n)P1 + an
t P2 + at(1 − P1 − P2)
f0(at)=n(1 − at)n−1P1 + na n−1
t P2 +( 1− P1 − P2) > 0 ¥
PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
We begin by maintaining all of the previous assumptions for the proof of Proposition
4.
We assume that (n − 1)P2 >P 1,i ti m p l i e st h a ta∗
M1 ∈ (0,1)
Let g(a;¯ n)be the function g(at) evaluates in at = a, with a parameter n =¯ n.
Let g(˜ a;¯ n)=0
Let g(˘ a;¯ n +1 )=0
We wish to prove that ˘ a<˜ a (provided that (¯ n − 1)P2 >P 1)
Note that proving the previous statement is the same as proving that g(˜ a;¯ n+1)< 0
(Remember the characteristics of the function g(at))
Therefore, we have to prove that g(˜ a;¯ n +1 )< 0.
We know that:
g(˜ a;¯ n)=( 1− (1 − ˜ a)¯ n)P1 +˜ a¯ nP2 − ˜ a(P1 + P2)=0⇔
(1 − ˜ a)P1 − (1 − ˜ a)¯ nP1 +˜ a¯ nP2 − ˜ aP2 =0⇔ (16)
˜ a − ˜ a¯ n
(1 − ˜ a) − (1 − ˜ a)¯ n =
P1
P2
On the other hand, if:
g(˜ a;¯ n +1 )=( 1− (1 − ˜ a)¯ n+1)P1 +˜ a¯ n+1P2 − ˜ a(P1 + P2) < 0 ⇔
(1 − ˜ a)P1 − (1 − ˜ a)¯ n+1P1 +˜ a¯ n+1P2 − ˜ aP2 < 0
Given(16), the previous expression will be true if and only if:
˜ a¯ nP2 − ˜ a¯ n+1P2 > (1 − ˜ a)¯ nP1 − (1 − ˜ a)¯ n+1P1P1 ⇔
˜ a¯ n − ˜ a¯ n+1




˜ a − ˜ a¯ n
(1 − ˜ a) − (1 − ˜ a)¯ n) ⇔
˜ a¯ n − ˜ a¯ n+1
(1 − ˜ a)¯ n − (1 − ˜ a)¯ n+1 >
˜ a − ˜ a¯ n
(1 − ˜ a) − (1 − ˜ a)¯ n ⇔
˜ a¯ n−2
(1 − ˜ a)¯ n−2 >
1 − ˜ a¯ n−1
1 − (1 − ˜ a)¯ n−1 ⇔
˜ a¯ n−2
1 − ˜ a¯ n−1 >
(1 − ˜ a)¯ n−2
1 − (1 − ˜ a)¯ n−1
It is straightforward to show that the left hand of the previous expression is increasing
in ˜ a, and the right hand is decreasing in ˜ a. Moreover, if ˜ a =
1
2
the two term are equal.
Therefore, if ˜ a>
1
2





























PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
The dynamics of the selection process S[n,k=1,θ≤ˆ θ] is given by the equation:
at+1 =
(1 − (1 − at)n)P1
(1 − (1 − at)n)P1 +( 1− an
t )P2
Let be at+1 = f(at) and
g(at)=f(at) − at =
(1−(1−at)n)P1
(1−(1−at)n)P1+(1−an









Since the denominator is greater than zero, the sign and the roots of the previous
expression depend on the numerator. Notice that the only diﬀerence between the func-




Moreover, since the equilibrium is decreasing in n (provided that P1 >P 2):
a∗[S[n,1,θ=1] ≥ a∗[S[n,1,θ≤ˆ θ]]
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
We consider the probability of promotion; if the system is in a period t and the
probability of an A-agent (PA(prom)) being promoted is greater than that for a B-
agent (PB(prom)), then the proportion of A -agents in period t +1is greater than in
t. Therefore, the population of A-agents has increased and the population of B-agents
has decreased.
A na g e n tc a nb ep r o m o t e di nt w od i ﬀerent events, i.e., he is either eligible and
successful (E.S.) or he is eligible and but unsuccessful (E.U.). Therefore, the probability
of an agent’s following the strategy i being promoted (in period t) can be written as:
Pi,t(prom)=Pt(prom/E.S.)Pi,t(E.S.)+Pt(prom/E.U.)Pi,t(E.U.)
Thus, the probability of promotion for an agent who follows strategy i is a linear
combination of the agent’s probability of being in event E.S. (i.e. Pi,t(E.S.))o ri nE.U.
(i.e. Pi,t(E.U.)), where the weights are given by the probability of being promoted in
each either event (i.e., Pt(prom/E.S.) and Pt(prom/E.U.)).
Observe the Figure 12,r e m e m b e rt h eF i g u r e2 and 3 of section 3.1:
It is straightforward to derive the following probabilities:
































t ,w ew o r ki nt h es a m ew a y
to derive Pi,t(E.U.) and Pi,t(E.S.).
We want study the local stability of the system in a =1and a =0 .








t k ES nθ −








t k ES nθ −
Figure 12:
For example, if we want to study the stability45 of a =1 ,t h e ni ti ss u ﬃcient to study
which promotion probability is greater when the state of the system is very close to one
(at ' 1). If the promotion probability of an A-agent is greater(smaller) than that of a
B-agent and that is true as much as the system closes to one is, then the state a =1
will be locally stable(unstable).(Analogously to a =0 ).
Notice that,
























PB,t(E.S.) ' P2 PB,t(E.U.) ' 0





t ), afterwards, we calculate the limit of this expression when
at goes to 1, and this limit is equal to P2. We work analogously to derive PB,t(E.U.).
The promotion probability for an A-agent when the state is close to one,at ' 1,will
be:









PA,at'1(prom)=m i n {θ,P1}k
n +m a x {θ − P1,0}k
n
PA,at'1(prom)=k
n(min{θ,P1} +m a x {θ − P1,0})
if θ<P 1 then PA,at'1(prom)=k
nθ
if θ ≥ P1 then PA,at'1(prom)=k
n(P1 + θ − P1)=k
nθ
And for a B-agent:
45In this proof, the stability we refer to is always the local stability
46See Section 5 to for an explicit expression of ESt and ES
a
t .
41PB,at'1(prom)=m i n {
θ
P1




















P1P2 if θ<P 1
P2 if θ ≥ P1
We know that if PA,at'1(prom) ≥ (<)PB,at'1(prom) then a =1is stable (unstable).
Thus, if θ<P 1 then a =1will be stable ( unstable) provided that k
nθ ≥ (<) θ
P1P2 ⇔
k
n ≥ (<) P2
P1.
On the other hand, if θ ≥ P1 then a =1will be stable ( unstable) provided that
k
nθ ≥ (<)P2.
Analogously, we can study the state a =0and we can derive the promotion proba-







P2P1 if θ<P 2
P1 if θ ≥ P2
Thus, if θ<P 2 then a =0will be stable (unstable) provided that k
nθ ≥ (<) θ
P2P1 ⇔
k
n ≥ (<) P1
P2. Since P1 >P 2,t h es t a t ea =0will be unstable provided that θ<P 2.




nθ<P 1 then the state a =0will be unstable, and if k
nθ ≥ P1 that
s t a t ew i l lb es t a b l e( s i n c ei fk
nθ ≥ P1 ⇒ θ ≥ n
kP1 >P 1 >P 2).
In short:
if θ<P 1 then
(
a =1stable if k
n ≥ P2
P1
a =1unstable if k
n < P2
P1
if θ<P 2 then a =0unstable
if θ ≥ P1 then
½
a =1stable if k
nθ ≥ P2
a =1unstable if k
nθ<P 2
if θ ≥ P2 then
½
a =0stable if k
nθ ≥ P1
a =0unstable if k
nθ<P 1
Note that, if θ<P 1 then k
nθ<P 1 and a =0will be unstable.
Since P1 >P 2 we can state;
• If θ<P 1 and,
k
n < P2
P1 then a =0and a =1are unstable.
k
n ≥ P2
P1 then a =0is unstable and a =1is stable.
42• If θ ≥ P1 and,
k
nθ<P 2 then a =0and a =1are unstable.
P2 ≤ k
nθ ≤ P1 then a =0is unstable and a =1is stable.
k
nθ>P 1 then a =0and a =1are stable. ¥
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7
The solution of our maximization problem is
¯ a =a r gm a x
a∈[0,1]
Π(a)




(P2(η + σ) − η)+a(P1(1 + η)+P2(1 − σ)) − a21
2
(P1 + P2)(2 + η − σ)
The ﬁrst and second derivatives are:
Πa =( P1(1 + η)+P2(1 − σ)) − a(P1 + P2)(2 + η − σ)
Πaa =( P1 + P2)(2 + η − σ)
The payoﬀ function is concave if σ<2+η convex if σ>2+η and lineal if σ =2+η.
Suppose that the payoﬀ function is either convex or lineal ( σ ≥ 2+η). We would
then have just two candidates for the solution of our maximization problem, which would
be a =1and a =0 .
We have that Π(a =0 )=1
2(P2(η+σ)−η) and Π(a =1 )=1
2(P1(η+σ)−η) if P1 >P 2
then ¯ a =1and if P2 >P 1 then ¯ a =0 .
If we suppose that the payoﬀ function is concave ( σ<2+η), then the maximum
will be:
ˆ a =
P1(1 + η)+P2(1 − σ)
(P1 + P2)(2 + η − σ)
Since a ∈ [0,1],i fˆ a>1 (< 0), then the solution to our maximization problem is
¯ a =1(=0 ). As σ<2+η, the denominator is positive and it is straightforward to show
that:








If P1 >P 2 then 1+P2
P1(1+η) < 1+P1
P2(1+η) ( N o t et h a ti nt h i sc a s e1+P2
P1(1+η) <
2+η)
If P2 >P 1 then 1+P1
P2(1+η) < 1+P2
P1(1+η) ( N o t et h a ti nt h i sc a s e1+P1
P2(1+η) <
2+η)





1 if σ ≥ 1+P2
P1(1 + η)
and if
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